Clad in civilian attire adorned with motifs representative of the Pasto Indigenous culture, Royer Garzón, a guerrilla leader and participant in peace negotiations, sits next to approximately twenty fellow combatants on a modest platform beside a concrete sports field in one of the Indigenous collective territories recognized by the state in Colombia’s Nariño region.
The majority of the attendees are dressed in military uniforms and rubber boots, standing in front of a prominent red-and-white banner that reads “FC Sur-ELN,” which stands for the National Liberation Army, the guerrilla organization from which they originated and whose identity they continue to embrace.
“Our commitment to peace is centered on a territorial peace, where local communities take the lead,” Garzón explains, emphasizing that without a thorough peace agreement, the Comuneros will remain armed.
The Comuneros del Sur group is at the forefront of President Gustavo Petro’s Total Peace initiative, having established 12 partial agreements aimed at exchanging arms for the opportunity to engage in legal gold mining.
With presidential elections approaching and rival armed groups posing threats, the 250 members of Comuneros del Sur, under Garzón’s leadership, advocate for the legalization of mining as a means to secure their livelihoods. However, obstacles in disarmament and concerns over rival incursions could hinder their progress. With gold prices soaring above $5,000 (approximately £3,700) per ounce in 2026, various armed factions are competing for control over Nariño’s mineral resources, imposing taxes on miners and exacerbating conflict.
As Petro’s presidency nears its conclusion, the prospects for peace in Nariño depend on whether the potential for legal gold can surpass the ongoing conflict—or if the upcoming elections will create an opportunity for warlords to regain power.
The Comuneros del Sur separated from the ELN in May 2024, citing a lack of autonomy in peace discussions with the guerrilla group, stating they aimed to progress more swiftly than the ELN permitted.
Many of its members hail from Nariño, though the group also includes a Venezuelan migrant and an Ecuadorian, comprising young individuals from Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and farming backgrounds in regions dominated by coca and gold production.
Now in his early 40s, Garzón has been engaged in the conflict for over two decades, yet he presents himself more like a historian than a militant leader. He speaks gently about his group’s involvement in Colombia’s most lucrative illegal economies and expresses his desire for peace, viewing this moment as a significant opportunity to transition back to civilian life.
The twelve partial agreements endorsed by the group encompass aspects such as arms destruction, coca crop replacement, and territorial development, with implementation underway as each agreement is achieved.
“We represent a movement rooted in territorial identity, with our guerrilla force deeply embedded in various sectors and regions of Nariño,” Garzón notes.
While it is unlikely that any armed group will achieve full demobilization during Petro’s administration, some progress has been made. However, in areas like Nariño, where high-revenue illicit economies such as gold mining and coca cultivation flourish, achieving lasting peace remains a challenge.
Garzón points out that coca cultivation, the primary source for cocaine, cannot provide a viable option for local communities or former combatants if disarmament occurs, as there is no avenue for its legalization. He also mentions that prices have significantly decreased due to overproduction and other factors.
“Coca is no longer a profitable venture,” Garzón asserts.
Despite a recent surge in coca cultivation, it is the coca farmers—often the most impoverished and vulnerable link in the cocaine supply chain—who have suffered the most from decades of anti-narcotics efforts, including aerial glyphosate spraying.
Conversely, gold mining presents a promising alternative.
Nariño is rich in mineral resources, including gold and essential minerals like manganese, which are crucial for steel production and play a vital role in electric vehicle batteries. Six armed groups are vying for control over these resources, as the history of gold mining in Latin America is deeply intertwined with violence and crime, dating back to the Spanish conquest.
Official reports from Nariño indicate gold production of 344 kg in 2024 and 196 kg the previous year, but local government sources estimate actual monthly production to range between 1,000 kg and 2,000 kg, suggesting discrepancies in official statistics.
Currently, manganese from Nariño supports the cocaine trade. Potassium permanganate, derived from manganese ore, is key in converting coca paste into cocaine hydrochloride. “Wherever manganese is found, there is either a coca paste kitchen or a crystallization lab,” explains a local miner.
Illegal manganese miners can earn around 5 million Colombian pesos (approximately £1,000) per ton on the black market, while the legal market offers only a fraction of that amount. However, this situation may shift as global demand for manganese increases due to the rising production of electric vehicles. Legal manganese mining for the renewable energy sector could provide a more lucrative opportunity than its use in cocaine labs, presenting an economic alternative for both armed groups and local communities.
Organized crime syndicates, including Brazil’s Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC) and Comando Vermelho (CV), have increasingly dominated gold mining across the continent, alongside Colombian armed groups such as the Gaitanistas, dissident factions of the FARC, the ELN, and Ecuadorian criminal organizations like Los Lobos.
Violence has escalated in response to the ongoing struggles for control over these lucrative resources, further complicating the path to peace in the region.
