Viktor Orbán’s recent loss in the Hungarian elections has sparked a wave of optimism among proponents of democracy. Observers worldwide are analyzing the implications of this outcome and contemplating the potential waning of far-right movements. Concurrently, there is a growing sentiment that Donald Trump has transitioned from being a source of motivation to a “liability” for far-right factions globally.
While Orbán’s defeat carries significant symbolic weight and may impact EU dynamics, particularly with regard to the EU-Ukraine agreement, it is essential to approach its interpretation with caution for several reasons.
Firstly, it is crucial to recognize that Orbán held power for an unprecedented 16 years, allowing him to effect extensive political, economic, and societal changes in Hungary. His electoral defeat did not signify a repudiation of his far-right agenda, including his anti-immigration stance, which is largely backed by the incoming prime minister, Péter Magyar. Instead, it stemmed from widespread dissatisfaction with the nation’s severe economic issues and allegations of substantial corruption during Orbán’s administration.
Magyar’s victory, set to be formalized on May 9, should not be interpreted as a strong affirmation of his policies. Rather, it resulted from his extensive campaigning in key constituencies outside traditional opposition territories within a highly disproportionate electoral framework. While this approach may yield success in majoritarian systems like those in France, the UK, and the US, its effectiveness would be significantly reduced in proportional systems, such as that of the Netherlands. Nevertheless, grassroots efforts and personal outreach still play a vital role, as evidenced by Zohran Mamdani’s work in New York City.
Secondly, although the European far right has lost its unofficial leader, it remains a formidable force. Other far-right parties have also faced electoral setbacks recently, such as in Bulgaria and the Netherlands. However, far-right factions continue to hold power in various EU member states, including Czechia and Italy, and they lead in polls in countries like Austria and France. The far right is entrenched in the political landscape, and its electoral support will continue to fluctuate due to factors like corruption and governmental crises.
Furthermore, the normalization and acceptance of far-right ideologies and figures are ongoing. Italy under Giorgia Meloni has become a focal point for politicians positioning themselves as tough on immigration, drawing interest from figures such as European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen and UK Labour leader Keir Starmer. The European People’s Party (EPP), a coalition of center-right parties across the EU, is now openly collaborating with far-right groups to advance legislation in the European Parliament while maintaining a connection with Meloni.
This cooperation extends beyond immigration issues. Even prior to the 2024 EU elections, the EPP has begun adopting far-right skepticism regarding climate change and environmental protections, aiming to retain discontented agricultural voters who might otherwise align with far-right parties.
Thirdly, while Trump currently appears “toxic” to the far right, this perception is not fixed. His controversial statements and actions, such as threats to occupy Greenland or imposing trade tariffs on the EU, can be detrimental to European far-right parties. However, when his narrative aligns with anti-establishment sentiments or immigration issues, he gains traction among far-right supporters, despite a general skepticism towards him among European voters. The much-discussed separation between Meloni and Trump is likely a tactical maneuver rather than a genuine ideological divide, suggesting it may only be temporary.
Trump’s position as the leader of the United States inherently influences European far-right movements. His remarks, regardless of how extreme, gain significant attention and are often integrated into mainstream media discourse and political rhetoric, as seen through the actions of NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte. This dynamic complicates the marginalization of similar arguments within Europe.
Moreover, Trump’s extreme behavior can make European far-right leaders appear “moderate” by comparison, as they can position themselves as “not as extreme as Trump.” This comparison can be advantageous for astute politicians like Meloni, who, by adopting a less aggressive style than Trump or Matteo Salvini, may be perceived as a conventional conservative rather than a radical-right figure. Additionally, underlying gender biases may lead to the assumption that women in politics are less extreme than their male counterparts.
It is important to acknowledge the significance of Magyar’s victory and the perseverance of the Hungarian populace in opposing Orbán, particularly the left-leaning voters who supported a right-wing candidate to preserve democracy. While the defeat of Orbán is a substantial achievement worthy of celebration, it is essential to avoid oversimplifying the situation to facilitate future electoral successes in both Europe and the United States.
Cas Mudde is the Stanley Wade Shelton UGAF professor of international affairs at the University of Georgia and the author of “The Far Right Today.”
