Provided by: Royal Australian Navy, ABIS Jayden Fahy

By acting defence and national security correspondent

The Department of Defence, an entity primarily focused on military operations, is often criticized for its convoluted terminology. In this context, naval vessels and aircraft are referred to as “platforms,” armaments are termed “capabilities,” and military personnel are labeled as “personnel.” Additionally, Australia’s approach to acquiring a fleet of nuclear-powered submarines is described as a “constrained optimal pathway.” Recently, this pathway has faced significant scrutiny.

As it stood last week, the proposal involved Australia purchasing two second-hand submarines in 2032 and 2035, followed by a new submarine in 2038. However, the most recent updates indicate that the plan has shifted to acquiring three used submarines, which the government now claims was its preferred strategy from the outset.

During estimates hearings this week, Defence officials faced pointed inquiries about this unexpected change. Critics questioned whether last week’s “optimal pathway” was indeed the best option, prompting Defence Secretary Meghan Quinn to assert that it is entirely possible to have “two constrained optimal pathways.” This statement led Senator David Shoebridge of the Greens to criticize the AUKUS initiative, suggesting it was both a financial burden to the public and a distortion of the English language.

The concept of constrained optimization, typically introduced in introductory economics courses, refers to identifying the best possible choice given existing limitations. This exchange underscores the challenges the government faces in articulating its evolving plans and the potential erosion of public trust regarding Australia’s most significant defence endeavor to date.

When the “optimal pathway” was initially revealed in 2023, concerns about its complexity were immediately raised. As noted by Richard Marles and others in recent discussions, the initial strategy would have resulted in Australia managing four distinct submarine types. Currently, Australia is investing substantial funds to extend the operational lifespan of its aging Collins Class submarines, with some expected to remain in service until the 2040s.

The Virginia-class submarines, which are being constructed in the United States, are set to be delivered in 2032 and 2035. The new Virginia-class submarine was anticipated to arrive in 2038, but specific details about its design remain undisclosed, though it is expected to differ significantly from its 2020s counterparts. Moreover, the first Australian-manufactured AUKUS submarine is projected to launch by 2042.

Marles has since maintained that Australia has had reservations about the original plan and that the preference from the beginning was to secure three in-service Virginia-class submarines to streamline the process. The United States had initially insisted on providing a brand-new submarine rather than three used ones, valuing older submarines more highly and being hesitant to part with three in-service vessels until now.

Defence Industry Minister Pat Conroy addressed the recent changes during an appearance on Radio National Breakfast, stating that improvements in submarine availability and maintenance within the US system have led to the US Navy’s newfound confidence in releasing a third in-service submarine. “This means it will be more cost-effective and straightforward for us to operate,” he explained.

There is a tacit acknowledgment within the government that this line of reasoning may seem counterintuitive, and communication surrounding the changes has been less than optimal. Officials have found themselves arguing that submarines a decade old are more advantageous than newer, advanced models. They assert that the Virginia-class submarines being procured will be in their prime, having undergone several years of service to address initial issues and still possessing decades of operational life ahead. The government contends that a submarine currently operational holds more value than a brand-new vessel, which explains the initial reluctance to offer three in-service submarines.

This argument may appear to some Australians as if the government is claiming that a ten-year-old Toyota Corolla, provided it has been well-maintained, is superior to a brand-new model fresh from the dealership.

As the AUKUS agreement was introduced in 2021 by the Coalition, the timeline for Australia’s first nuclear-powered submarine was projected to be over fifteen years. However, recent adjustments made by the current government to acquire Virginia-class submarines have shortened this timeline, with the first Australian-flagged nuclear-powered submarine now expected to be ready in just over five years. The project is becoming increasingly concrete, requiring significant financial investment—up to $96 billion by 2036—along with the construction of shipyards and training for sailors.

The AUKUS initiative is also likely to face heightened scrutiny. There have been calls for the Labor government to reassess its commitment to AUKUS, particularly given the uncertainties surrounding the current US administration. Officials frequently emphasize that AUKUS represents the largest industrial undertaking Australia has ever embarked upon, with the nuclear-powered submarines poised to be the most formidable military assets in the nation’s history.

The challenges are not confined to Australia. Substantial funds are being allocated to US shipyards to expedite submarine production, while the UK is also facing its own shipbuilding difficulties as it strives to launch its first AUKUS-class submarine by the late 2030s. The prevailing message this week has been that these modifications aim to simplify the overall process.