In 2018, Vladimir Putin referred to Russia’s newest ballistic missile systems as “invincible.” By 2022, these missiles were employed in strikes throughout Ukraine, targeting command centers, essential infrastructure, and airfields. The following year, Ukraine received Patriot air defense systems from its international allies, with the U.S.-supplied missile interceptors proving effective against Russian assaults.
However, as 2023 progressed, Ukraine faced a shortage of Patriot missiles, leading to severe repercussions. The interception rate plummeted from over 70% to zero, allowing Russia to strike Ukrainian infrastructure without facing any defensive countermeasures. This situation was anticipated, and finding immediate solutions is unlikely.
While the narrative surrounding the conflict has often highlighted the effectiveness of cost-efficient Ukrainian weapons overcoming sophisticated Russian military technology, the significant damage inflicted by Russian long-range attacks has primarily come from cruise and ballistic missiles. Ukraine’s defense efforts have suffered due to a lack of effective countermeasures against these types of weapons. Intercepting ballistic missiles is a complex and costly endeavor.
To intercept a tactical ballistic missile like Russia’s Iskander, a defense system must be extraordinarily advanced. Such missiles descend from high altitudes at speeds exceeding five times the speed of sound while maneuvering unpredictably. The defense system must accurately track the missile’s location and relay this information to the interceptor, which must then adjust its course while ascending against gravity. The development of the necessary radars, data links, and interceptors demands extensive research and investment, which NATO countries have largely relied on the U.S. to provide over the years to enhance the Patriot system.
The United States, along with licensed manufacturers in Germany and Japan, can produce approximately 840 Patriot interceptors annually. This includes around 240 older PAC-2 interceptors, which detonate upon nearing their target, necessitating a substantial warhead, and 600 PAC-3 interceptors, which are smaller and engage directly with their targets. The latter is more effective but requires even more precise navigation, while the former can address a broader range of targets.
In contrast, Russia produces about 750 Iskander missiles each year and is working to boost production. Additionally, Russia employs air-launched Kinzhal missiles, repurposed air-defense missiles, cruise missiles, and drones for its attacks. To achieve a high success rate, it is generally advised to launch two to three interceptors against each ballistic missile. Given that the launchers can only cover a limited area and Ukraine is expansive, it becomes evident that Kyiv would ideally require three to four times the annual global production capacity of Patriot missiles for adequate protection. Consequently, supporting nations have had to allocate their own stockpiles to Ukraine.
Even before the U.S. made the decision to attack Iran, Western allies expressed concerns about depleting their own missile reserves by supplying Ukraine with Patriot systems, knowing it would take considerable time to replenish their stocks. The U.S. strike on Iran, which prompted Tehran to launch ballistic missiles throughout the Middle East, has exacerbated a global missile shortage. While Russia typically fires fewer than ten ballistic missiles in a single attack, Iran has launched as many as 170 daily in the current and previous year’s conflict, with some missiles being advanced. In one instance, 17 Patriot interceptors were required to neutralize a single missile, and Iran possesses a substantial stockpile of additional missiles.
Currently, it is unlikely that Ukraine will acquire sufficient Patriot missiles before winter arrives to safeguard its critical national infrastructure, despite some countries potentially offering additional missiles from their reserves. Consequently, Kyiv must prepare for a winter characterized by severely compromised power supplies and bolster essential life-support systems such as water, sanitation, electricity, and heating.
Kyiv is attempting to persuade the U.S. to activate Starlink satellite navigation modules over Russian territory to assist drones in locating Russian missile launchers. However, as demonstrated in Iran, executing such missions over large areas is notably challenging. Another strategy being pursued by Kyiv involves targeting the production facilities of Russian ballistic missiles, which are heavily fortified. Success in this area would necessitate increased funding and industrial capacity for Ukraine’s developing cruise-missile program or reconsideration of supplying advanced weapons systems, such as Germany’s Taurus, which Berlin has hesitated to provide due to concerns about escalating military tensions.
The overarching lesson here is that NATO members have significantly faltered in their defense planning. The numbers illustrating the need for expanded Patriot production and the development of alternative systems, such as the Franco-Italian SAMP-T, have been evident since prior to 2022, yet investments to enhance these capabilities have not been made. This level of complacency severely impacts Ukraine today and poses a risk to Europe’s future defense readiness. It is striking that, in light of the unfolding events at its borders, Europe has remained largely inactive.
Jack Watling serves as a senior research fellow for applied military sciences at the Royal United Services Institute.
