It was particularly symbolic that the critical judgment against Manchester City was announced during the Labour party conference, coinciding with the enthusiastic reception of Andy Burnham’s speech as he outlined his vision for the party’s future.
During a lengthy meeting of the Socialist Campaign Group, where members celebrated Keir Starmer’s leadership changes and Burnham’s progressive stance, I found myself engrossed in the shocking 40-page report detailing how Manchester City allegedly fabricated contracts to artificially inflate their income by £900 million.
Burnham’s address centered on the misguided decisions made by Britain under Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s, particularly the privatization of public services like housing, water, energy, and transport. He emphasized that while they aimed to build a common good, the resulting wealth was exploited by a select few rather than benefiting the broader community.
This sentiment could easily apply to the world of football as well. Since its acquisition by Sheikh Mansour from the Abu Dhabi royal family in 2008, Manchester City exemplifies how “the people’s game” has been transformed into a lucrative enterprise. Originally founded in the industrial era by local churches, schools, and community groups, clubs like City were sold off just as football began to enjoy newfound financial prosperity.
I have reported on this financial transition since the early days of my journalism career, and Burnham also engaged with these issues during his early involvement with New Labour’s football taskforce.
In my 1997 publication, “The Football Business,” I drew parallels between the commercialization of football and Thatcher’s privatization policies, resonating with many fan groups protesting against soaring ticket prices and exclusive broadcasting deals. The emergence of the Premier League, with its new wealth, had created barriers that alienated many traditional supporters.
My realization about the changing nature of football occurred during a previous takeover of Manchester City in 1994, when former player Francis “Franny” Lee became the owner. Growing up in Manchester, I have always been a devoted City supporter, with vivid memories of attending matches hand-in-hand with my father during the 1970s.
For fans of my generation, City’s only major trophy was the 1976 League Cup, won with a stunning overhead kick by winger Dennis Tueart. I may not be an art expert, but that iconic photo of Tueart’s goal is one I have admired countless times, capturing the moment perfectly.
Unlike Manchester United, Liverpool, and Arsenal, City has not enjoyed prolonged success. Their golden era was brief, spanning just two years from 1968 to 1970, followed by a relegation in 1983. City supporters became known for their unwavering loyalty and humor, often bringing inflatable items to games, while they longed for a return to glory.
When Lee took over the club, it felt like a moment of salvation for fans. I was fortunate to interview him shortly after his takeover, and during that visit, I began to realize that Manchester City had transitioned from a traditional club to a corporate entity, operated by a consortium of investors.
During my visit, legal representatives showcased their corporate strategies, including the establishment of Manchester City plc, aiming to align with the influx of revenue from Rupert Murdoch’s Sky TV, which had revolutionized broadcasting in the Premier League since its inception in 1992. This shift in wealth significantly increased the valuations of top clubs, and the consortium intended to list City on the stock market, emulating Manchester United and others, to eventually sell shares for profit.
They had devised holding companies to circumvent the Football Association’s long-standing regulations that restricted dividend payments to shareholders and salaries for directors. These regulations, established in the early days of professional football, were intended to maintain the club’s community-focused ethos. However, as football evolved into a commercial powerhouse, these rules were seen as outdated, stifling the industry’s potential for growth.
Such critiques were presented to Labour’s football taskforce, with the Football Supporters’ Association advocating for robust regulations to ensure that the benefits of the new era were fairly distributed. Fans recognized that Germany’s approach to the pay-TV transformation allowed for corporate restructuring while ensuring that clubs remain under the control of supporter associations with a majority stake.
While New Labour was unlikely to introduce significant reforms or establish a football regulator, Burnham made considerable efforts to advocate for the interests of fans and the integrity of the sport.
