On a Sunday morning in the summer of 2003, I found myself driving into a small beach town in South Africa along the Indian Ocean to collect the local Cape newspapers. The newsstands, adhering to traditional English customs, displayed the front pages prominently on A-frame boards outside. At that time, the Iraq War was just beginning, and from a distance, I could easily spot a striking headline that read: “WHY BUSH IS WORSE THAN BIN LADEN.”
This headline was disheartening, particularly given the distance from home, yet it reflected a pattern I was familiar with: American global favorability often fluctuates dramatically during times of war, particularly those initiated by the United States, and is heavily influenced by the sitting president. In the wake of the Iraq invasion, the international goodwill the U.S. had enjoyed post-9/11 quickly evaporated.
By 2003, following the invasion of Iraq, American favorability had plummeted to historic lows, hovering around 30-40%. In contrast, this figure had typically been above 50% during the presidencies of Jimmy Carter, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. Bush, while Bill Clinton’s presidency saw favorability ratings soar into the 70% range. Notably, some military actions, such as George H.W. Bush’s Gulf War to liberate Kuwait, garnered global support, unlike the Iraq conflict. However, favorability rebounded significantly with Barack Obama’s election, achieving heights of 75-80% in various countries.
The term used to describe this global favorability in foreign policy is “soft power,” which refers to the ability of a nation to influence others through culture and appeal rather than military might. The U.S. government has historically supported this soft power with initiatives like foreign aid and international broadcasting, exemplified by Voice of America. Nevertheless, the impact of culture often surpasses government efforts; popular figures like Beyoncé can wield more influence than bureaucratic policies. In general, cultural influence prevails over policy, except in times of war.
During my tenure as the under secretary of state for public diplomacy in the Obama administration, I saw my role as akin to the chief marketing officer for “Brand USA.” The objective was to cultivate and enhance America’s image on the global stage. In the past, for instance, we dispatched cultural icons like Louis Armstrong and Ella Fitzgerald to Eastern Europe as ambassadors to demonstrate American ideals of freedom and diversity. Concurrently, initiatives such as Voice of America and Radio Free Europe were established to provide accurate news to regions under oppressive regimes.
It is important to note that these initiatives were not devoid of ulterior motives; many were funded by the CIA. The deployment of Black American artists to Eastern Europe aimed to counteract Soviet narratives regarding racial issues and civil rights struggles in the U.S., which were largely accurate. Additionally, American influence in countries like Guatemala, Iran, and Italy often reflected the more complex and darker aspects of soft power.
However, I am concerned that due to Donald Trump’s actions and his conflict in Iran, American standing in the world may decline to unprecedented lows, possibly never returning to the median favorability levels seen during the presidencies of Carter and Reagan. The approval rating for Trump’s handling of global affairs was already at 30-40% prior to the Iranian conflict, and this may become the new standard. As Trump remarked in a recent White House address, “The world is watching.” Indeed, it is.
Both allies and adversaries have long been puzzled by the cyclical nature of American politics, where conservative leadership is frequently succeeded by liberal administrations and vice versa. Biden’s assertion post-election that “America was back” and poised to be a dependable ally was met with skepticism from our partners, who wondered, “For how long?” This skepticism is understandable. The Biden administration seemed to view Trump as an outlier, surrounded by two liberal internationalists, but evidence suggests that Biden himself may be the anomaly.
Since Woodrow Wilson’s era, American presidents have engaged in promoting democracy, but this chapter may be closing. With the ongoing conflict in Iran, U.S. involvement in Venezuela, and increasingly aggressive rhetoric regarding Cuba, the Trump administration appears to be reviving the archetype of the Ugly American, now devoid of the previous emphasis on democracy. The image of America as a self-absorbed and culturally ignorant bully has resurfaced with renewed intensity. Headlines from international publications reflect this sentiment, with Le Monde labeling the Iran war as “A Reckless Imperial Error” and Die Zeit commenting on how Trump is transforming the U.S. into a source of chaos.
Traditionally, the Ugly American represented a figure who was somewhat naive yet occasionally well-meaning; these clumsy Americans simply failed to grasp the complexities of the world. In contrast, Trump has redefined this archetype into the Immoral American, characterized as a predatory figure who is transactional and likely aware of the implications of his actions. The Immoral American epitomizes a more unscrupulous and corrupt persona than the Ugly American and, unlike the latter, cannot be reformed but must be replaced.
Projecting Trump’s questionable character onto the American identity has the potential to inflict lasting harm on the nation’s reputation. In countries such as Germany, the UK, Spain, and France, support for the war is alarmingly low, with only 20% of the population in favor. A fifth of Europeans view the U.S. as the primary threat to global peace, rather than Iran. Consider the implications for an ally: when the U.S. president invites the Japanese prime minister to the Oval Office and makes an insensitive reference to Pearl Harbor while seeking assistance in the Strait of Hormuz, how will she respond? Support for the war in Japan stands at a mere 10%. Trump often overlooks the fact that foreign leaders must consider their domestic constituencies.
The notion of “America first” has largely translated to “America alone,” marked by a pattern of unilateral decisions by the U.S. that further alienate its allies and complicate international relations.
