It has now been five weeks since the onset of military conflict involving Iran, with the situation evolving into a scenario that is far from the initially anticipated “precise and overwhelming military campaign” aimed at dismantling a supposed nuclear threat and encouraging the Iranian populace to rise against their government. The anticipated swift resolution has not materialized; instead, Iranian retaliations have led to heightened tensions in the Gulf region, the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and no sign of the Iranian regime’s collapse through either military pressure or popular insurrection. The recovery of two downed U.S. aircrew members has been celebrated, but it underscores the absence of success in other areas, highlighting a combination of overconfidence and misunderstanding regarding the complexities of the Iranian state.
At the beginning of military conflicts, a mental adjustment period often occurs, where the reality that such dangerous situations cannot be quickly resolved sets in. This cognitive delay is particularly pronounced in U.S. engagements, where there is a prevailing belief that a dominant military power should easily achieve its goals against a weaker adversary, and that allies will readily support U.S. actions. The assumption that the repercussions of military operations will be confined to the intended targets has proven to be misguided.
The current conflict has already begun to disrupt energy markets, with forecasts suggesting a potential global economic recession if hostilities persist. Former President Donald Trump has struggled to garner support from European and Gulf allies for the offensive or for efforts to reopen critical shipping routes. Meanwhile, the Iranian government continues to withstand U.S. military actions, inflicting significant costs on American resources and personnel.
The miscalculations stem from an overestimation of American resolve. When the military campaign against Iran was initiated, proponents were swept up in the belief that a new American-led order was imminent. Editorial boards, such as that of the New York Post, described the conflict as a “generational move,” while the Wall Street Journal suggested it could lead to a safer Middle East. Those who expressed skepticism about these optimistic views were often dismissed as overly pessimistic, with commentators insisting that the war would be resolved quickly—yet this has not been the case.
As the initial confusion dissipates, discussions are now focused on potential quagmires and strategies that Trump could adopt to withdraw without appearing defeated. The pressing question echoes a sentiment raised by General David Petraeus during the Iraq War: “How does this end?” The unfolding situation reveals that Iran possesses intricate internal dynamics that cannot be reduced to the simplistic narrative of a weakening regime facing inevitable collapse.
The first critical error was underestimating Iran’s capacity for asymmetric warfare. The country does not need overwhelming military strength to destabilize the Gulf region; it can disrupt normal life, damage energy infrastructure, and impose significant costs on both U.S. allies and the global economy through less conventional means. A series of low-cost drone attacks, combined with missile strikes, have effectively achieved this objective.
The second miscalculation was the expectation that Iran would refrain from employing its most significant leverage—closing the Strait of Hormuz, which would escalate the costs of the conflict dramatically. Even prior to last year’s 12-day war, concerns over the potential closure of this vital waterway were raised, indicating that such a move was always a consideration for Iran.
The third error lay in the assumption of an imminent popular uprising against the regime, which has not occurred due to various factors. The risks of public protests during ongoing bombing campaigns, coupled with a government that has previously suppressed dissent, along with a complex public opinion landscape, have all contributed to the absence of widespread civil unrest.
These misjudgments stem from a fundamental misunderstanding of the Iranian regime’s resilience and its ability to endure prolonged conflict without a clear pathway to military victory against a superpower—a notion that seems inconceivable to the American leadership.
The political landscape in the region has largely been shaped by nations aligning with U.S. power. For the last four decades, the narrative in the Middle East and the broader Arab world has revolved around cultivating relationships with the United States, thereby benefiting from its economic support and security guarantees. This situation has led Iran to view its Gulf neighbors as vulnerable, perceiving them as indirect participants in the conflict due to their alignment with U.S. interests and normalization of relations with Israel.
In this context, the U.S. has fallen into a false sense of security, believing that all paths lead to capitulation—either through embracing the advantages of U.S. influence or surrendering to its dominance. This logic does not hold for nations that have chosen a different course, especially those like Iran, which continue to resist external pressure.
