On Wednesday, the Supreme Court asserted its ability to determine the nature of religious practices that may be deemed superstitious. However, the Central Government countered that secular courts, guided by the Constitution, lack the requisite “scholarly competence” to make such assessments and should defer to the legislature instead.
Justice Joymalya Bagchi, part of a nine-judge bench reviewing constitutional issues stemming from petitions challenging the September 28, 2018 ruling that lifted age restrictions on women’s entry into the Sabarimala temple, remarked that while the legislature has a role under Article 25(2)(b) to regulate secular activities related to religion, this does not eliminate the court’s residual authority in appropriate cases. The bench, led by Chief Justice Surya Kant, includes Justices B V Nagarathna, M M Sundresh, Ahsanuddin Amanullah, Aravind Kumar, Augustine George Masih, Prasanna B Varale, and R Mahadevan.
Justice Amanullah emphasized that the issue is not merely simplistic, asserting that the court has the jurisdiction to define superstition, while the legislature must determine the appropriate response. He noted that the court should not be relegated to a position where the legislature has the final say on such matters. Solicitor General Tushar Mehta, representing the government, argued that if a practice is superstitious, it is not for the court to adjudicate; rather, it is the legislature’s responsibility under Article 25(2)(b) to enact reforms.
Mehta articulated that secular courts should not label religious practices as superstition due to a lack of expertise, stating, “My lords are experts in law, not in religious matters.” He further pointed out the diverse interpretations of what constitutes superstition across various cultural contexts in India, warning against the court’s potential overreach in this pluralistic society.
Justice Bagchi posed a provocative question: if witchcraft is considered a religious practice, would it be classified as superstition? In response, Mehta acknowledged that courts could intervene in extreme cases, such as human sacrifice or cannibalism, where practices would shock the conscience. The bench also scrutinized the standing of the petitioners in the Sabarimala case, questioning how individuals with no direct affiliation to the temple could challenge its customs. Justice Nagarathna highlighted that the original petitioners were not devotees of the temple, prompting inquiries about their legitimacy in bringing forth the case.
Mehta clarified that the case originated from a Public Interest Litigation filed by the Indian Young Lawyers Association in 2006, which is one of the seven issues currently being evaluated by the bench. Justice Nagarathna suggested that this foundational question be addressed first.
Chief Justice Kant referenced the earlier 5-judge bench’s perspective that if a public interest element is present, the court has the authority to examine the issue. Justice Nagarathna noted that a lawsuit initiated by such an association would likely have been dismissed for lack of standing.
Senior Advocate Indira Jaising, representing the Association, expressed frustration, stating that two decades have passed since the matter began, and if the intent is to dismiss the case, they are prepared to withdraw. She urged that the reference should either be resolved or discussed on its merits, indicating their willingness to address each case individually as it arises.
Ultimately, the court opted to proceed with the hearing, with the Chief Justice affirming, “Today we have crossed that bridge.” He indicated the importance of addressing the formulated questions, noting that several will significantly affect the review process. The hearing is scheduled to continue on Thursday.
